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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CREST MOTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
ALEXANDER S. FISH, 





Respondent disagrees with the Statement of Facts 
as set forth by the appellant in his brief since the 
evidence was conflicting and the facts as stated by the 
Appellant represent basically his testimony in the 
trial court with the emphasis placed on his theory of 
the case, ignoring the familiar principle requiring a 
fair statement of the facts upon which the decision of 
the trial court was predicated and based upon which 
judgment was awarded the Respondent. 
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RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February, 1962, Respondent purchased a 1960 
Cadillac and a 1956 Chevrolet from the Appellant 
as the result of a telephone conversation between the 
Appellant and Mr. Dee Timothy wherein the Ap-
pellant wanted to sell the automobiles to Respondent 
and indicated that he, the Appellant, had bought the 
Cadillac off the curb (R.30) and that he had taken 
the 1956 Chevrolet in as his commission on the sale 
of a new car ( R. 31 ) . 
The Appellant, Alexander Fish, had his place of 
business in Detroit, Michigan, while Respondent has 
~ts place of business in Salt Lake City (R. 28), hence 
negotiations for the sale and purchase were con-
ducted by telephone. 
After the parties had agreed on a purchase price, 
$2,700.00 _for the Cadillac and $300.00 for the Chev-
rolet, if purchased together, (R. 30, 31 ), the deal was 
consumated, and Appellant shipped the cars to Salt 
Lake City, by rail.. (R. 37). 
Subsequently, the Respondent had repairs made 
on the Cadillac, totalling $355.20, and paid trans-
portation on the automobile totaling $t06.80. (R. 15, 
16). 
Thereaf~e.n . R~spondent sold the Cadillac., _and 
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3 
when it was discovered that the vehicle was in fact 
a stolen automobile, the Respondent was obliged to 
return it to its rightful owner which entailed re-
purchase of the vehicle. (R. 34) 
Mr. Kenneth E. Schefski, the owner and manager 
of the Independent Auto Damage and Appraisers 
company, testified that he examined the Cadillac that 
the serial number stamped on the frame definitely 
established that it was an automobile Serial No. 
60L059259, (R. 25, 26), whereas the title furnished 
by Appellant supposedly covering this vehicle was 
the title to an automobile Serial Number 60L030424. 
(Ex. 3). 
Mr. Fish, the Appellant, indicated in his testimony 
that the automobile had been stolen from a Cadillac 
dealer in Michigan, and the door plate identification 
number,. which is a _small plastic plate, had been 
removed, and another, plate attached, with a number 
correspondi!lg with the title he provided the Respond-
ent. , (R. 97). · 
The trial court ruled for the Plaintiff and found 
that Plaintiff had purchased the automobile from Mr. 
Fish, the Appellant. 
Other material facts will be set out as they relate 
more specifically to the points raised by th~ Ap-
pellant as a basis for his appeal. 
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Statement of Points 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPOND-
ENT PURCHASED THE AUTOMOBILE IN QUESTION 
FROM THE APPELLANT IS CONCWSIVE OF POINT I 
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF RELATING TO THE QUESTION 
OF AGENCY. 
II 
ASSUMING THAT AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP DID 
EXIST, TKEN APPELLANT WAS SO NEGLIGENT IN THE 
PURCHASE OF THIS VEHICLE THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD 
HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO RECOVER. 
.. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The findings of the Trial Court that Respondent pur-
chased the automobile in question from the Appellant is 
conclusive of Point I of Appellant's brief relating to the 
question of agency .. 
The Court having found that the Respondent pur-
chased the 1960 Cadillac from the Appellant, under 
the familiar principle that the evidence will be 
examined to determine its sufficiency to support that 
determination,. and that this Court will not substitute 
its analysis of the evidence and the weight thereof 
for that of the trial court, the proper inquiry is as to 
whether there is competent evidence to support the 
determination of the trial court.1 It becomes obvious 
~herefore, that Appellan~'s statement at page 10 of 
his brief that "It is considered that the record clearly 
cliscloses that the Defendant served as agent-factor of 
the Plaintiff in the purchase of the 1960 Cadillac 
automobile concerned herein," is erroneous, and an 
assumption, which flies in the face of the scope of 
the inquiry of this court. If there is competent evi-
dence from which the Court could find as it did, the 
judgment must be sustained. 2 
1. Dalton v. W adler, 11 Ut. 2d 84, 385 P. 2d 69; Chris_tensen 
v. Christensen, 9 Ut. 2d 102, 339 P. 2d 101; Nau7oks v. 
Suhrmann, 9 Ut. 2d 84, 337 P. 2d. 967; Child v. Child, 8 Ut. 
2d 261, 332 P. 2d. 981. 
2. Storr v. Grant, 2 Ut. 2d 421, 276 P. 2d 489; Christensen v. 
Christensen, sapra. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
The evidence which sustains the Court's ruling is 
as follows: 
Mr. Dee Timothy, testified that in the telephone 
conversation he had with the Appellant concerning 
this automobile Mr. Fish represented to him that he, 
Mr. Fish, had purchased the Cadillac off the curb 
CR. 30),that Mr. Fish quoted him a price of $2,700 for 
the car in a package deal CR. 30, 31 ) , that he, Mr. 
Timothy, said that "For this year and model of car 
this is an awfully cheap price" CR. 30), that Mr. Fish 
replied that this is what he thought before he bought 
it, SO· he sent it down and had it checked by the police 
before he bought it. C. 30, 120) ; that the telephone 
conversations took place on February 21, 1962, and 
that he agreed to purchase the two automobiles CR. 
31), and made arrangements to wire the money to 
J.V[t. Fish's account at his Detroit bank as per instruc-
tions from Mr. Fish CR. 31, 47, 48). 
Mr. Timothy also testified that as to the 1956 
Chevrolet included in the package deal at $300.00, 
that he had been offered this car on prior occasions 
by Mr. Fish who said that he had sold it new thereto-
fore and had now taken it back as his commission on 
the sale of a new automobile to the same people 
<R. 31). 
Exhibit 1, is the check to First Security Bank for 
furtds to be wired to Alexander Fish, dated February 
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~ l, 1962 for payment in full for a 1960 Cad. S. de Ville, 
56 Chev BA 4 Dr. Exhibit 2 is the draft forwarded to 
the account of Alexander Fish at Manufacturers Na-
tional Bank in Detroit. These funds arrived on Feb-
ruary 23, 1962. ( R. 33) . 
The title to the 1960 Cadillac reveals that it was 
notarized February 21st, by Alexander Fish. Fish 
admitted that he gave his personal check to the owner 
of the 1960 Cadillac in payment thereof, ( R. 84, 96) 
although he contended that his account was without 
funds to cover the check until Respondent's draft 
reached his bank ( R. 96). 
Neither the 1956 Chevrolet title nor the 1960 
Cadillac title were in the name of Mr. Fish when 
received by the Respondent, but Mr. Timothy ex-
plained that this is a usual business practice when-
ever an automobile is taken in, and that "The usual 
practice is that you never change the title into your 
own name. Regardless of whether the title comes 
from Mr. Fish or a private title, you only hold the 
title until you make sure it is signed off correctly. 
You only hold the title in your possession until you 
sell it, and then the State issues a new title to the 
customer or whoever buys the car. (R. 35, 36). As 
Mr. Timothy stated, if the Court were to deal with 
him~ the transaction would be handled the same way. 
<R. 36). 
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On cross examination, Mr. Timothy re-iterated 
that Mr .. Fish had agreed to sell him cars CR. 40), that 
Mr. Fish sold him cars, perhaps as many as 25 CR. 
41), that on one occasion, when he was in Detroit, 
Mr. Fish personally delivered him two titles out of 
his wallet, representing two automobiles that he pur-
chased from Mr. Fish while there. (R. 43). 
Mr. Timothy indicated that he never had paid 
Mr. Fish a commission on any transaction, only the 
price for the automobile, which Mr. Fish quoted him 
as the purchase price of the car ( R. 45) . 
1\tlr. Timothy indicated also, that he had visited 
Mr. Fish, the Appellant, at his home in Detroit, that 
Mr. Fish had automobiles in his yard and on a lot 
immediately adjoining his home CR. 50); that in fact, 
while there he purchased two automobiles from Mr. 
Fish which were: parked on the adjoining lot CR. 50). 
It is clear that the Respondent purchased the 1960 
Cadillac from the Appellant, just as he purchased 
the 1.956 Chevrolet from· the Appellant, and many 
other vehicles, including two while in Detroit, and 
that the evidence amply sustains the decision of the 
trial court that there was an independent buyer-seller 
relationship between the parties in dealing with the 
Cadillac, and not an agency relationship. 
At page 11 of his brief, Appellant cites the Restate-
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1nent of Agency, 2nd Ed. Sec .. 14, which sets up 
factors indicating that no agency exists ( 1) that he 
is to receive a fixed price for the property irrespective 
of the price paid by him, [This is. the exact fact in 
the instant case, where the price quoted was $2,7 00.00 
for the Cadillac and $300.00, for the Chevrolet (R. 30, 
31) l (2) that he acts in his· own name and receives 
title to- the property which he is thereafter to transfer 
Un the instant case, Mr. Fish received the title and 
forwarded it to- the Respondent in keeping with the 
usual business practice which dictates that the dealer 
does not appear on the tide, but of course, Gould if 
he so desired] (3) that he has an independent 
business in buying and selling· similar· property [In 
the instant case the testimony clearly establishes that 
this is precisely· what Mr~ Fish does ( R. 30, 31 ) 1. 
It is true, that Mr. Fish soughtby his testimony 
to establish that Respondent paid a commission on 
this transaction and that the commission was stated 
to the Respondent in advance (R. 76}. ·This was flatly 
denied by Respondent (11'7, 45,), and on cross ex-
a-mination. Mr~ Fish left some question a bout his prior 
statem·ent (R. 86; 8 7) . 
Since the trial court had. the oppo~ity to ob-
serve the witnesses; and· evaluate· their demeanor as 
well as their testimony, these factual questions have-
alr~ady been. reselved favorably to-. the Respondent 
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1{) 
and his credibility as compared to that of the Appel-
lant firmly established. 3 
Appellant, at page 12 of his brief recites several 
sections of the Michigan law, excluded by the trial 
court by reason of lack of proper foundation CR. 66), 
and equally inappropriate in Appellant's brief before 
this Court, as pursuasive of the proposition that Appel-
lant was not the owner of the vehicle he bought in 
Michigan, and that some one else must have been 
the owner, sincehe would have been violating some 
of those statutes if it were otherwise. 
Counsel for Respondent, suggested on cross-ex-
amination of Mr. Fish that there . were perhaps 
reasons that Mr. Fish proceeded as he did to avoid 
putting titles in his own name, and although Mr. Fish 
was quick to deny those reasons, they are perhaps as 
pursuasive reasons as now suggested by Appellant in 
his brief. ( R. 109) . 
Certainly, the statutes of Michigan whatever they 
may say do not change the fact that the trial court 
believed the Respondent when he said that he pur-
chased this automobile from Mr. Fish7 and that Mr. 
Fish had told him that he, Mr. Fish, had bought if off 
the curb. CR. 30). What complications this provides 
for Mr. Fish with the Michigan law is not the con-
3. Page, v. Federal Security Insurance Co., 8 Ut. 2d 226, 332 
P. 2d 666; Child v. Child, 8 Ut. 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981.-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
cern of this case, nor is the Michigan law probative 
of the facts of the case. 
Appellant cites American Jurisprudence, Brokers, 
Sec. 4, and Section 2, at p. 14 of his brief. However, 
the findings of the Court clearly take the present case 
out of the factual situations covered by either. 
Similarly with the citation of American -Jurispru-
dence, Factors, Section .6, and 35 C.J.S. Brokers, Sec-
tion 4. While probably good statements of general 
law, none is applicable to the facts here established 
by the trial court. 
A brief statement of the facts of the case of Twohig, 
vs. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 118 Fed. Supp. 322, 
cited by the Appellant serves at once to distinguish 
that case. In the cas.e, the Plaintiff became the agent 
of Mid States Packing Company for the purchasing of 
cattle on a commission basis. In the present case, the 
court found from substantial and competent evi-
dence, that Respondent purchased the automobile 
from the Appellant, negating any agency theory 
advanced by Appellant. 
The cases Bashford vs. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 
123 Cal. App, 204, 11 P. 2d- 51; and Couturie vs. 
Porsch, 134 S.W. 413 are similarly inapplicable; and 
in the case of Beakley vs. Ranier, 78 S.W, 702, the 
question of agency or lack thereof plays no part in the 
decision. 
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·A case of infinitely more assistance to the Court is 
the case of Pashalian vs. Big-4 Chevrolet Company, 
Inc., (Mo. App.) 348 S.W. 2d 628. In that case, 
Pashalian contacted a used car dealer named Lesch 
to purchase a 1958 Chevrolet Bel-Air four-door Sedan. 
Pashalian actually instigated the transaction in that 
case, however. Lesch took a deposit and gave him an 
allowance for his trade-in. Lesch then went to a new 
car dealer, the Defendant, and told the salesman that 
he wanted to buy such a car and got a quotation on 
the price. Thereafter, Lesch told the Defendant the 
name of the person in whose name the papers shpuld 
be made, and the Defendant Big-4 executed the nec-
essary documents direct to Pashalian. Lesch gave his 
check to Big-4, and Pashalian gave his check to Lesch, 
in payment for the car and received the car. The 
Lesch check was subsequently returned by the bank 
marked "account closed." Pashalian instituted a suit 
for conversion after the Defendant Big-4 obtained 
possession of the automobile when it was returned for 
servicing. As in the case at bar, Pashalian, the buyer, 
dealt solely with Lesch, and the Defendant contended 
the Lesch was the agent of Pashalian in obtaining 
the automobile from the Big-4 Chevrolet Company. 
The court in considering the question of agency, 
stated first, that there is never. a presumption of 
agency, arid the burden of establishing it is on the 
party asserting it and by whom it is alleged to exist. 
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The court concluded from the evidence that 
Plaintiff dealt solely with Lesch, and thought he was 
buyian.g from Lesch; that there was no evidence that 
Plaintiff even knew the Defendant. The Defendant 
knew that it was transferring title directly to 
Pashalian., but it had a dlliect transaction with Lesch. 
The court after reviewing the evidence was of the 
opinion that there was nothing about the transaction 
which would justify a finding, that any agency existed 
between Pashalian and Lesch, and affinned a judg-
ment for the Plaintiff, Pashalian. 
In the case at bar, Respondent thought he was 
cdealing directly with Fis~ did not know the party 
prior in the transaction to Fish, and the title passed 
directly from the prior party to ~e Plaintiff. 
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POINT II 
Assuming that an agency relationship did exist, then 
Appellant was so negligent in the purchase of this 
vehicle that Plaintiff would have been entitled to recover. 
Appellant's second point is completely outside the 
decision of the Trial Court. It assumes that Appellant 
was Respondent's agent, that the purchase was from 
~nother by Appellant as agent for the Respondent, 
and 'then asserts that the record establishes reason-
able care and diligence on the part of the Appellant 
in handling the purchase; 
·, Respondent asserts that the decision of the trial 
~our{ was and· .is conclusive of Appellartt's second 
point. However, the Respondent's testimony estab-
lishing lack of diligence on the part ,of the Appellant 
is such that it is clear that Appellant could not prevail 
even if he was correct on the question of agency. 
Respondent's testimony establishing lack of dili-
gence on the part of the Appellant is that he repre-
sented that he had taken the vehicle to the police for 
inspection when in fact he had not (R. 30, 75); that 
all he did was call the police station and read them 
what was on the title (R. 75, 76, 99, 100), from 
which, naturally, nothing could be determined about 
the automobile itself; that he at no time examined 
the permanent number stamped in the frame of the 
automobile, but only looked at the plastic number 
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15 
on the door fra1ne ( R. 93), which is removable being 
merely screwed on ( R. 93), and this despite his testi-
mony that he "figured something was wrong" (R. 
75}; that he called Mr. Timothy and said "Stop wir-
ing the money. Wait until I call you back. It doesn't 
look good on it. And the guy just doesn't look right 
to me." <R. 76). On cross examination he re-iterated 
this feeling that something was wrong an.d that his 
experience as a dealer caused him to have this feeling 
(R. 92). 
Mr. Timothy, on behalf of Respondent testified 
that he had been a dealer for three years (R. 117) 
that if he were suspicious of a vehicle he would know 
where to find the permanent number on the frame 
and that it was open to public view by opening the 
hood. Mr. Fish with at least ten years experience 
(R. 66) said he had never seen one and wouldn't 
know where to look ( R. 98) . Mr. Schefski, who made 
the positive identification of the vehicle examined the 
serial number stamped on the frame rail ( R. 24, 25) . 
It is submitted, that even if the facts of agency 
we~e as asserted by the Appellant, that this evidence 
sufficiently establishes suspicious circumstances 
known to the agent which would require positive 
steps on his part in relation to the automobile itself, 
to establish physical identification of the vehicle on 
behalf of his principal. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted by the Respondent that the judg-
ment of the trial Court is amply sustained by the 
evidence, that there was no error on the part of the 
trial court in ruling as he did that the Respondent 
purchased the automobile in question from the Appel-
lant, and that the relationship between them was 
that .. of buyer and seller, and that accordingly, the 
judgment is fully sustainable. It is further submitted 
that even if the court were to determine that an 
agency relationship existed which it did not, that 
even in such event, the Respondent would be entitled 
to recover based upon the negligence of the alleged 
agent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH A. SHEFFIELD 
534 South 2nd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
916 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
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